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RECAP; Ibsen v. Caring for Montanans, Inc.: Can You Sue Your 




I.   JOHN MORRISON FOR APPELLANT IBSEN 
 
Mr. Morrison began his oral argument by stating that CFM 
illegally included rebate payments in its health insurance premiums and 
was fined $250,000 for this conduct by the State Auditor. He opined, under 
the district court’s opinion, insurance customers have no remedy for this 
conduct. Mr. Morrison returned to this theme throughout his argument.  
Mr. Morrison first argued that Montana has long recognized that 
insurance companies are liable for breaching the insurance code. Justice 
Cotter asked about the status of the plaintiff, a business who purchased 
insurance on behalf of its employees and is not a beneficiary to the plan. 
Mr. Morrison responded that Ibsen is in a contract with CFM and argued 
Ibsen is considered a member of the policy under Montana small group 
law. Justice Cotter followed up by asking where in the record the allegedly 
breached contract could be found. Mr. Morrison answered the policy itself 
is what was breached. Justice Shea followed up by asking if the breach 
claim could be sustained without alleging the violation of the insurance 
code, which Mr. Morrison responded it could, for instance under a bad 
faith claim. Mr. Morrison argued, however, that the insurance code should 
be incorporated into the contract under Montana law.  
Next, Mr. Morrison argued that under the enforcement provision1 
of the UTPA, an order by the commissioner does not absolve a party of 
other civil liabilities. Prompted by a question from Justice McKinnon, he 
asserted that the section of the UTPA which specifies the actions available2 
is only intended to affect claim handling suits. Justice Baker next pointed 
out that the complaint alleges violations of both the Title 30 general UTPA 
and the Title 33 Insurance UTPA, and asked if Title 30 could provide a 
remedy. Mr. Morrison vaguely responded that Title 30 had not been part 
of the briefing in the case. Justice Cotter next asked whether the common 
law claims could stand alone without pleading violations of the UTPA. 
Mr. Morrison responded that they could because the conduct is a breach 
of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment. Justice Cotter followed up by 
asking if all of the counts in this case are premised upon the violation of 
the UTPA, to which Mr. Morrison answered they plead breach of fiduciary 
duty, breach of contract and unjust enrichment in the alternative. Prompted 
by a follow up form Justice Shea, Mr. Morrison acknowledged that the 
                                           
1 MONT. CODE ANN. § 33–18–1004(4) (2015). 
2 MONT. CODE ANN. § 33–18–242(3). 
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count alleging a violation of the UTPA could not survive absent a private 
right of action for violating the UTPA. Justice Baker followed up by 
asking about factual differences between the Montana cases the Appellants 
cite and the current facts. In her question, Justice Baker suggested that 
violations of the UTPA were allowed in past cases as evidence to support 
recognized torts, but do not create an independent cause of action.  
Mr. Morrison argued that at the very least, Ibsen should be 
allowed to move forward with its unjust enrichment claim because the 
unjust enrichment claim is completely independent of the UTPA. He 
finished by noting that the federal case of Fossen3 was decided incorrectly, 
opining that the holding stripped insurance consumers of their rights. 
Finally, Mr. Morrison argued that a federal court had already decided that 
ERISA does not preempt this action.  
 
II.  Michael McMahon for Appellee CFM and Stanley Kaleczyc for 
Appellee HCSC 
  
Mr. McMahon began by telling the Court that the Plaintiffs and 
amici are asking the Court to judicially legislate a cause of action which 
the legislature has already rejected. He asked the Court to send the 
Plaintiffs to the legislature to make their policy changes. Mr. McMahon 
emphasized that federal courts and a Montana district court correctly 
concluded there is no private cause of action for a violation of the UTPA. 
Mr. McMahon asserted that Ibsen told the federal court that its causes of 
action are based solely on violations of the UTPA, likely to avoid ERISA 
preemption.  
Justice Baker asked Mr. McMahon to address the Appellant’s 
arguments involving previous Montana cases, and Justice McKinnon 
followed up with specific questions. Mr. McMahon responded that 
O’Fallon,4 Thomas,5 and Williams6 do not allow an independent claim 
based on a statutory violation, but instead allow evidence of a 
nonactionable breach of duty in a separate actionable claim. Justice Shea 
asked if this is similar to negligence per se claim, and Mr. McMahon 
agreed that a negligence per se claim may be appropriate here, though it 
was not pleaded. Mr. McMahon next argues that Ibsen is not an insured, 
and says the Appellant’s new argument that they are an insured under 
Montana small group policy would support ERISA preemption.  
Mr. McMahon next moved to the legislative history, and argued 
that the legislature purposefully restricted the causes of action under the 
UTPA. Justice Wheat argued that Montana has never adopted the model 
                                           
3 Fossen v. Caring for Montanans, Inc., 993 F. Supp. 2d 1254 (D. Mont. 2014). 
4 O’Fallon v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 859 P.2d 1008 (Mont. 1993). 
5 Thomas v. Northwestern National Ins. Co., 973 P.2d 804 (Mont. 1998). 
6 Williams v Union Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 123 P.3d 213 (Mont. 2005). 
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provision of the UTPA which explicitly bars causes of action based on a 
statutory violation. Mr. McMahon responded that this provision was only 
meant to clarify the intent of the original act as passed by the Montana 
legislature. Mr. McMahon opined that allowing every insured to sue when 
the Auditor conducts a market conduct exam would open the litigation 
floodgates and deter insurers from offering policies in Montana.  
Justice Baker asked Mr. McMahon why the UTPA, which 
contains a private right of action clause, is not being used in this case. Mr. 
McMahon responded that Title 30 violations would clearly be preempted 
by ERISA. Mr. McMahon finished by arguing that Fossen is highly 
persuasive to the Court on the UTPA, and binding to the Court on ERISA 
preemption. He reminded the court that Ibsen has remedies other than 
creating a new cause of action under the UTPA such as ERISA. He asked 
the Court to dismiss the suit, either because ERISA preempts or because 
there is no private right of action under the UTPA.  
Stanley Kaleczyc for HCSC used the last few minutes of the 
Appellee’s time to briefly ask the court to affirm he district court. He 
summarized some of the arguments made by Mr. McMahon and added 
that HCSC should be dismissed as a party because the conduct occurred 
before HCSC purchased Blue Cross Blue Shield’s assets.  
 
III.   REBUTTAL OF JOHN MORRISON FOR APPELLANT IBSEN, INC. 
 
Chief Justice McGrath started off the rebuttal of Mr. Morrison by 
asking him which of the causes of action are independent of the UTPA 
violation. Despite a follow up, Mr. Morrison never clearly answer the 
question. He transitioned to asking the court to give the victims of the 
UTPA violations a remedy. Justice Rice asked Mr. Morrison Ibsen told the 
federal court that all of their causes of action were based on the statutory 
violations, as Appellee claimed. Again, Mr. Morrison tactfully avoided the 
question. He noted they did not file a negligence per se claim because the 
conduct in this case was intentional.  
Mr. Morrison offered several legal options to the Court to avoid a 
floodgate case. First, the Court could limit cases to consumers with actual 
damages. Second, the Court could specify only suits from plaintiffs who 
are a member of the class which the statute is meant to protect. Third, the 
Court could take these suits on a case-by-case basis.  
Mr. Morrison finished by re-emphasizing that the federal courts have 
already decided there is not ERISA preemption. He also argued that HCSC 
should not be dismissed as a corporate successor.  
 
IV.   ANALYSIS 
 
During Mr. Morrison’s arguments, several members of the 
court—including Chief Justice McGrath, Justice Cotter, Justice Baker, and 
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Justice Shea—asked about potential remedies in this case without a private 
right of action under the UTPA. These potential remedies, which the trial 
court concluded were an attempt to backdoor the exclusive enforcement 
power of the State Auditor, include the breach of contract, breach of 
fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment. Further, there are other remedies 
under Title 30, which plaintiff was apparently avoiding because of likely 
ERISA preemption. The Court also has the option to decide that ERISA 
preempts this cause of action, though the Justices did not seem as engaged 
in these arguments. Mr. Morrison seemed reluctant to answer the questions 
regarding other remedies, possibly to force the court to decide whether 
there is a private cause of action under the UTPA. Because of these 
recurring questions, I predict the Court may decide the UTPA does not 
have an independent cause of action—or even avoid the question 
altogether—and instead remand the case for the Appellee to pursue one of 
the other available remedies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
